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Will Taiwan Contemplate a "Nuclear Option"? 
Security Imperatives and Normative Transformation 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang* 
This paper examines the role of nuclear weapons, if any, in Taiwan s 
defense strategy. Facing acute existential threat and having no 
representation in global and regional security forums, Taiwan has 
nonetheless chosen nuclear restraint. This is due to instrumental 
considerations and normative change. While Taiwan is not completely 
certain about the commitment of its key backer- the United States -- to its 
security (a policy known as "strategic ambiguity''), the main pillars to its 
security remain conventional deterrence and Americas tacit nuclear 
umbrella - in addition to its economic strengths and democratic appeal as 
soft power. The paper explores Taiwan s attempt during the Cold War to 
develop nuclear weapons, the conflicting objectives of the United States, 
and the post-Cold War normative evolution. It also analyzes the 
(extraordinary) conditions under which Taiwan might contemplate a 
"nuclear option, " assesses the pros and cons of this action; and argues 
that maintaining a "virtual" or near-proliferating capacity is advisable in 
the light of evolving trends in the military balance (especially 
conventional force) in the Taiwan Strait. 
* Vincent Wei-cheng Wang is Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at the 
University of Richmond. He has published extensively on East Asian politics and 
international relations, East Asian-Latin American comparative political economy, and 
Taiwan's politics and external relations. His most recent interest is on the rise of China 
and its implications on Asian security. He received his Ph.D from the University of 
Chicago. 
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Introduction: Taiwan's Security Situation and Nuclear Stance 
The 9 October 2006 nuclear test conducted by North Korea 
resurrected the debate over the political and strategic utility of nuclear 
weapons. In East Asia, where adjoining states with historical enmities 
are experiencing rapid but differential rates of growth that provide the 
financial means for developing such disruptive military technologies as 
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the specter of a Second Nuclear 
Age1 emerging as a result of intensified security concerns can not be 
discounted. 
Among all the Asian states, Taiwan (officially, Republic of China, or 
ROC) arguably faces the most acute security situation. On the one hand, 
its main security threat, China (or People's Republic of China, PRC), 
claims sovereignty over Taiwan and has never renounced the use of force 
against Taiwan. Already a nuclear weapon state, China's military and 
economic power has been increasing so rapidly that many analysts worry 
that the cross-Strait balance is shifting (or has already shifted) in China's 
favor. 2 The threat posed by China is threatening Taiwan's very existence 
1 Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second 
Nuclear Age (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). 
2 See Office of the Secretary of Defense. 2006. Annual report to Congress, Military 
Power or the Peoples Republic of China 2006 and David Shambaugh, "A Matter of 
Taiwan: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage." The Washington Quarterly 23(2) (2000): 
119-133. 
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and way of life 
On the other hand, due to its diplomatic isolation (largely as a result of 
China's strangulation), Taiwan has no recourse to multilateral security 
organizations such as United Nations Security Council or ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF). No major country except the United States has 
a substantial security relationship with Taiwan. But even the U.S. 
support is not unconditional. The U.S. abrogated its 1954 defense treaty 
with Taiwan (hence cancelling a formal nuclear umbrella over Taiwan) in 
1978 as one of the conditions for normalizing relations with the PRC. 
There is considerable debate over whether U.S. "residual" commitment to 
Taiwan's security under Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) constitutes an 
implicit nuclear umbrella. For example, the TRA declares that it is the 
policy of the United States to "consider any effort to determine the future 
of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United 
States," to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character," and to 
"maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or 
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan," but it does not obligate the 
U.S. to defend Taiwan in case of Chinese hostilities against Taiwan. 3 
This policy of "strategic ambiguity" was designed to keep both China and 
Taiwan in check. It is thus clear that unlike Japan or South Korea- both 
treaty allies to the U.S., Taiwan cannot take America's extended 
deterrence for granted. 
3 Taiwan Relations Act. 1979. Public Law 96-8. The text is available online at 
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/about_ait/tra/. 
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For these understandable reasons, Taiwan has often been identified as 
country with a good reason or considerable potential for possessing 
nuclear weapons as part of its comprehensive strategy of survival in an 
adverse security environment. For example, a recent Foreign Policy 
online article asks if Taiwan would be one of the "next nuclear states" due 
to its past development and acute security threat. 4 A recent article by 
Prof. Stephen Peter Rosen, a national security expert at Harvard, in 
Foreign Affairs also lists Taiwan as a possible nuclear state, along with 
Japan, if nuclear arms races emerge in East Asia.5 Prof. Andrew Mack 
of Australian National University grouped Taiwan along with Japan, 
South and North Koreas in a category called "virtual nuclear powers" who 
could acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time but 
have chosen not to do so. 6 In other words, these analysts think the main 
constraints to Taiwan's becoming a nuclear state are political, rather than 
technological. 
Yet it is widely acknowledged that today Taiwan does not have 
nuclear weapons,7 but has a fairly sophisticated civilian nuclear power 
industry, which produced over 20 percent of Taiwan's total electric power 
. 8 
m recent years. 
4 Foreign Policy. 2006. "The List: The Next Nuclear States," (web exclusive 
article )(October), http:/ /foreignpolicy.com/story/cms. php?story-id=3616&print= 1. 
5 Stephen Peter Rosen, "After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear." 
Foreign Affairs 85(5) (September/October 2006), 11. 
6 Andrew Mack, "Potential, Not Proliferation." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
53(4) (July-August 1997): 48-53 
7 See Federation of American Scientists report on Taiwan, available at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/nuke/index.hmtl. 
8 Government Information Office (Taiwan), Taiwan Yearbook 2004, p. 148; The 
Republic of China Yearbook, Taiwan 2002, 164. 
----, 
I 
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Why Taiwan has chosen nuclear restraint and instead to rely upon 
America's tacit nuclear umbrella yet at the same time maintain substantial 
civilian nuclear expertise? This article argues that given its peculiar sets 
of domestic and external constraints, Taiwan's strategy of maintaining a 
"virtual nuclear option" is a prudent strategic choice. The reasons are 
complex, and include both normative and instrumental considerations, as 
this article will explain. 
Officially, Taiwan adheres to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.9 
The government's position on nuclear weapons is a categorical "four 
noes" policy - Taiwan will never "develop, produce, store, or use" nuclear 
weapons, 10 or an even stricter "five noes" policy (the above "four noes" 
plus acquisition). 11 The current ruling party, Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), went a step further by espousing a "nuclear-free homeland" 
(feihe jiayuan) on Taiwan and has established a special agency within its 
cabinet (Executive Yuan) to promote this vision. 12 
Because non-proliferation is a prevailing international norm and a 
paradigm dominating U.S. foreign policy, even though Taiwan is not a 
member of the UN, as a client state to the U.S., adhering to the 
non-proliferation regime is important to winning its patron state's support. 
9 Michael Tsai, Deputy Minister of National Defense, interview by the author, Taipei, 
Taiwan, 23 December 2005. 
10 
"Taiwan Will Never Develop Nuclear Weapons: Military Spokesman," Agence 
France Presse (20 October 2004). 
11 Ministry of Defense (Taiwan), 2004 National Defense Report, p. 221; interviews with 
Michael Tsai, 23, and Prof. Chien Chung, National Tsing-hua University, Hsinchu, 
Taiwan, 20 December 2005. 
12 Executive Yuan Nuclear-Free Homeland Commission, Taiwan's Choice: A 
Nuclear-Free Homeland (Taipei 2003); Dr. Min-sheng Ouyang, Minister, Atomic 
Energy Commission, interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 December 2005. 
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The logic is this: by eschewing its independent nuclear capability, Taiwan 
hopes to enhance the credibility of America's extended deterrence- albeit 
one that Taiwan has never been completely certain about. 
Still, a few scholars, analysts, and watchdog groups have linked 
Taiwan to nuclear weapons and every few years reports speculating 
Taiwan's past nuclear programs or future intentions would surface. The 
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit organization founded by 
CNN Founder Ted Turner and former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, estimates 
that "Taiwan probably possesses the technological expertise necessary to 
develop nuclear weapons, but U.S. pressure and the possibility of a 
pre-emptive strike by China have prevented a resumption of the nuclear 
weapons program."13 
A key reason for this lingering suspicion is that Taiwan apparently 
attempted to develop a nuclear weapons program in the 1960s-70s, and 
then again in the 80s, which ended in 1988 due to intense pressure from 
the U.S. 14 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace classifies 
Taiwan as one of those nuclear "abstaining countries" (or states formerly 
13 About NTI, http://www.nti.org/b_aboutnti/b_index.html, and NTI Profile on Taiwan, 
h,ttp :/ /www.nti.org/e _research/profiles/Taiwan/print/index. prt. 
14 For details of Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, see Derek Mitchell, "Taiwan's 
Hsin Chu Program: Deterrence, Abandonment, and Honor," in Kurt M. Campbell, 
Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States 
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), 
293-313; David Albright and Corey Gay, "Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted." 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54(1)(January-February 1998): 54-60; William Burr, 
"New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese 'Nuclear Intentions', 1966-1976." National 
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 19(13 October 1999), available online at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/. The best and hitherto most 
detailed work written in Chinese is Chung Chien. [i[~], jJJ;r)Jft/lfj : fWJffjJf(itjf$Jl.f:J!l 
f!i [Core of the Bomb, Zero Hours: How the Two Sides of the Taiwan Straits Went 
Nuclear] (Taipei: ~EBt±l!llii [Maitian Press], 2004). 
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possessmg nuclear weapons) as of 1995. This group refers to those 
industrialized countries with the technological base, but not the desire, to 
develop nuclear weapons, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, South 
Korea, and Sweden. 15 
Rather than deciphering these inconclusive reports and subsequent 
official denials or clarifications, this article adopts a more promising 
approach for understanding the role of nuclear weapons, if any, in 
Taiwan's security strategy. This approach aims to systematically analyze 
Taiwan's "virtual nuclear option" by taking into account both its 
capabilities and intentions. 
These two interrelated aspects roughly correspond to "supply-side" 
and "demand-side" factors, respectively. The former relates to feasibility 
(whether Taiwan can do it), whereas the latter relates to desirability 
(whether Taiwan ought to do it). In arms control lexicon, supply-side 
strategies seek to prevent the transfer of weapons technologies to 
would-be proliferators, whereas demand-side strategies seek to address 
the security concerns behind the drive for the bomb. 16 
In the case of Taiwan, on the issue of nuclear weapons, both its 
capabilities and intentions are conditioned by broader issues such as 
global nonproliferation regime, prevailing technological availability, 
regional security environment, and threat perception, but none more 
15 Leonard S. Spector, Mark G. McDonough, with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1995 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1995), 8. 
16 Andrew Mack, "Potential,": 51-52. 
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important than U.S. security and foreign policy, relationship with the U.S., 
and robustness of U.S. security commitment. Hence, relying on the 
conventional discourse on nuclear weapons (the nonproliferation 
paradigm), which takes the supply-side perspective and has a strong 
normative overtone, is likely to produce a partial and incomplete account 
(and set of recommendations) for Taiwan's nuclear choices. As the 
history of Taiwan's past nuclear program shows (see below), these larger 
strategic and diplomatic factors on the demand side played a key part in 
shaping Taiwan's previous nuclear choices. They will also be crucial for 
understanding, or even predicting, Taiwan's future nuclear choices. 
The rest of the article is divided into four sections. The first section 
provides a succinct overview of Taiwan's nuclear weapons program 
during the Cold War, deduces the most important lessons from that 
experience, and discusses the complex U.S. attitudes and motivations. 
The second section discusses Taiwan's current nuclear programs. The 
third section assesses the rationales and constraints for Taiwan's 
revisitation of the nuclear option. The fourth section provides policy 
recommendations. 
Taiwan's Nuclear Programs and Ambiguous U.S. Policies During the 
Cold War 
The Taiwan case confirms many insights from mainstream theories on 
the role of nuclear weapons in a country's security policy, but also adds 
its unique complexity. It can also be fruitfully compared with those 
other countries facing severe security challenges (e.g., Israel). It is thus 
useful to begin discussing Taiwan's past, present, and future nuclear 
policy in the context of the larger issue of why states want nuclear 
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weapons. 
States seek nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons: coping with an 
acute threat, prestige, political clout, and economic benefits. 17 Scott 
Sagan contrasts three "models" of states' nuclear decisions: (1) "the 
security model": states build weapons to increase national security against 
foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; (2) the "domestic politics 
model" envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance 
parochial domestic and bureaucratic interests; and (3) "the norms model": 
nuclear weapons decisions are made because weapons acquisition, or 
restraint in weapons development, provides an important normative 
symbol of a state's modernity and identity. 18 
Whereas great powers, especially the superpowers, use nuclear 
weapons to maintain deterrence, 19 their client states usually must rely on 
the patron states' extended deterrence, 20 or occasionally, with their 
patrons' acquiescence or even assistance, their independent deterrent (e.g., 
Israel). If extended deterrence-- one nation (the patron) threatens action 
if any attack is made against a third party or ally (the client state) - is 
credible (the metaphor is "nuclear umbrella"), then there will be less 
incentive for the client state to seek nuclear weapons. The client state 
(U.S. being the main guardian of the global non-proliferation regime) can 
17 Miles A. Pomper, "Is There a Role for Nuclear Weapons Today?" Arms Control Today 
35(6)(July-August 2005): 6-12. 
18 Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of 
a Bomb," International Security 21(3)(Winter 1996-97): 54-86. 
19 Russell Hardin, et al., Nuclear Deterrence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985). 
20 Paul K. Ruth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988). 
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thus accomplish the dual goal of preserving the international norm of 
non-proliferation and enhancing the credibility of its commitment to its 
allies. 
The patron can bolster the credibility of its extended deterrence by 
various signals, such as establishing treaty or legal obligations for its 
defense of the client state (either bilaterally, suchas U.S.-Japan Alliance, 
or multilaterally, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or storing 
nuclear arms on the soil of the client states. For example, recently 
declassified material shows that the U.S. secretly deployed nuclear bombs 
in 27 countries and territories during the Cold War.Z1 In the case of 
Taiwan, the U.S. started storing nuclear weapons on Taiwan in January 
1958, and completed their withdrawal in July 1974, as part of Nixon's 
attempt to improve U.S. relationship with the PRC. 22 In a classic 
patron-client relationship, the patron fears entrapment (fighting a war that 
is not in its national interests), while the client fears abandonment. The 
attitudes and actions of the patron thus play a decisive part on the client 
state's perception of security and choice of security strategies. 
21 See Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr, "Where They Were." 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55(6)(November-December 1999): 26-35; "Companion 
Page to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999 Issue," National 
Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, 20(0ctober 20, 1999), available at 
http:/ /www.gwu.edu/~nsarchi/news/19991 020. 
22 Norris, Arkin and Burr, Appendix B: Deployment by Country; "Defense Department 
Memorandum of Conversation, 'Call by Ambassador Unger,' 12 April1974," in which 
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger expressed concern that U.S. nuclear weapons be 
withdrawn from Taiwan before more visible steps to reduce the U.S. military presence 
there are taken. Location of original: National Archives, Record Group 84, Top Secret 
Foreign Service Post Files, Embassy Taipei, 1959-1977, box 1, file "Def 
15-9-Reductions-ROC, 1973. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchi/news/19991020/01-01.htm 
and http:/ /www.gwu.edu/~nsarchi/news/19991 020/0 1-02.htm. 
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Because the U.S. was, still is, and is likely to remain, Taiwan's chief 
security guarantor, U.S.-Taiwan relationship has displayed many of the 
characteristics mentioned above. Taiwan's nuclear programs - civilian 
or military - were and still are critically shaped by U.S. policies, and 
these policies have changed over the years in response to changing U.S. 
national interests. 
During the Cold War, in the nuclear context, the U.S. sought to 
achieve three goals: (1) nonproliferation and arms control (to enhance 
global security and norm development), (2) extended deterrence (to 
preserve alliance solidarity and U.S. reputation), and (3) commercial 
interests (to promote American nuclear power industry). This 
three-pronged strategy was linked by the quid-pro-quo mandated in the 
1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT): The five nuclear weapon 
states (U.S., USSR, Britain, France, and PRC) agreed not to transfer 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to other states and 
non-nuclear weapon states agreed not to seek or develop nuclear weapons 
in return for their "inalienable right" to use nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes (Article IV, Sec 1), subject to IAEA safeguards. Under NPT, 
nuclear powers have a responsibility to assist developing countries with 
their energy needs (Article IV, Sec 2). 23 
These multiple goals - sometimes complementary and sometimes 
contradictory - are clearly at work when we examine the various roles 
U.S. played in Taiwan's civilian and military nuclear programs during the 
Cold War. 
23 For the text ofNPT, see http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html. 
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Taiwan's civilian nuclear power and military nuclear weapons 
industries started roughly the same time - in the 1960s. It is useful to 
consider these two industries together not only because there existed 
substantial technological overlap between them (the first stage of making 
nuclear weapons - the production of fissile materials, such as 
uranium-233, uranium-235, or plutonium-239- is the same as generating 
nuclear power)24 but also because the U.S. played key roles in both. 
Officials are still reticent about Taiwan's abandoned nuclear weapons 
program, but in recent years, more information has emerged. Rather 
than belaboring with details, I summarize the key developments of 
Taiwan's nuclear programs during the Cold War in Table 1 and refer to 
the references in note 21. 
(Table 1 about here) 
From this table, we can deduce a few lessons. First, Taiwan's 
nuclear aspirations were driven by an acute sense of insecurity. The 
genesis of the Hsin Chu Project was a direct result of China's successful 
explosion of a nuclear bomb in 1964. The PRC had threatened to use 
force to "liberate" Taiwan. The prospect that the PRC could now use its 
nuclear weapons to wipe out Taiwan was deeply unsettling to ROC 
President Chiang Kai-shek (his reaction could be compared to U.S. 
President Dwight Eisenhower's reaction against the Soviet Union's 
successful Sputnik launch in 1957). Chiang tried to persuade U.S. 
President Lyndon Johnson to take out China's nascent nuclear arsenal to 
no avail. So he, and especially his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, resolved to 
develop an indigenous nuclear weapons program. 
24 Chien Chung, Core of the Bomb, 137. 
Will Taiwan Contemplate a "Nuclear Option"? 43 
There was dissent. For example, Prof. Ta-you Wu, former president 
of Academia Sinica in Taipei - and then director of the Science 
Development Advisory Committee of Taiwan's National Security Council 
(NSC) wrote to Chiang to oppose the Hsin Chu Project on the grounds 
that the plan underestimated the true costs, risked confrontation with the 
U.S., and overestimated the chance of success?5 However, at that time 
Taiwan's authoritarian political system overruled people like Wu, 
obviated an informed public debate, and permitted the clandestine 
execution of the project. 
Taiwan's military fully supported the Hsin Chu Project by providing 
manpower and resources. To illustrate the heavy financial burden of this 
five-year $140 million (NT$4.8 billion) project, Taiwan's central 
government net expenditure in 1968 was only NT$32.2 billion26 -- in 
other words, the cost of the Hsin Chu project amounted to 15% of 
Taiwan's central government net expenditure. 
There was another impetus: national pride. In 1957, Drs. Chen-ning 
Yang and Tsung-dao Lee, both Ph.D.s from the University of Chicago, 
became the first ethnic Chinese scientists to win the Nobel Prize in 
Physics.27 This inspired many young, bright, ahd idealistic students in 
Taiwan to study nuclear physics, and the military tapped into this talent 
25 Albright and Gay, "Taiwan," 55; Wu, Ta-you [~:kW\], "A Historical Document- A 
Footnote to the History of Our Country's 'Nuclear Energy' Policies" (in Chinese). f!Jf!c 
Y: ¥£ [Biographical Literature] 52(2)(May 1988)[quoted in Albright and Gay, 
"Taiwan."] 
26 Chung, Core of the Bomb, 158. 
27 University of Chicago Physics Nobel Laureates, 
http://www-news.uchicago.edu/resources/nobel/physics.html. 
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pool. 
The experience of Dr. H is illustrative. After graduating from one of 
Taiwan's best high schools, he chose to study physics at the military-run 
Chung-cheng Institute of Technology (CCIT), which is also located in 
Lung Tan, like CSIST and INER, about 45 minutes by car south of Taipei. 
Because NTHU had the only instructional reactor in Taiwan at that time, 
CCIT students spent much time at NTHU and many of them later, after 
receiving advanced degrees from abroad, became faculty at NTHU. 
After college, Dr. H was assigned to INER, and then after working there 
for two years he was sent to study in the U.S. He received a Ph.D. and 
had a postdoctoral fellowship in the U.S. before returning to INER. He 
recalled, 
At that time, INER employed over one thousand people. 
Two-thirds were technicians and administrative support 
staff. On average, each researcher had two support 
staffers. The pay was excellent and the morale was high. 
I felt proud about what I was doing, because I was young 
and more prone to following orders back then. 28 
The reactor purchased by INER, the TRR, was the same design as 
Canada's NRX (National Research eXperimental) reactor; it had a 
"cousin" in South Asia -- the CIRUS reactor India purchased in 1960 
(Fourteen years later, in 1974, India made and tested nuclear weapons 
from the plutonium produced from that reactor). At full operation, TRR 
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could produce ten kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium a year; so in 
twelve years it could produce sufficient weapon-grade plutonium. 29 
TRR reached critical mass on 3 January 1973. Taiwan's nuclear 
weapons program accelerated in the 1970s. This acceleration correlated 
directly with the nation's deteriorating diplomatic fortune and security 
outlook: ROC was expelled from the United Nations in 1971, and 
thereafter all UN-affiliated organizations?0 The enunciation of the Nixon 
Doctrine signified the United States' desire to gradually disengage from 
East Asia. In 1972, Nixon visited mainland China, and signed the 
Shanghai Communique, committing the U.S. to normalize relations with 
China. On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that the U.S. 
would recognize Beijing and sever diplomatic ties with Taipei on January 
1, 1979. In fact, Carter accepted all the three conditions demanded by 
China since the early 1970s - withdrawing troops from Taiwan, 
abrogating the USA-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, and breaking 
diplomatic relations - without providing security commitment to 
Taiwan. 31 Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), which 
mandated the U.S. to help Taiwan defend itself and formed the basis of a 
29 Chung, Core of the Bomb, 155); interview with Dr. H. 
30 The U.N.'s recognition of the PRC as the only legal government of all China - the 
so-called "one China"- poli~y raised the interesting possibility that Taiwan could claim 
to nuclear weapons state status, but in the end, Taiwan decided to accede to the 
requirements of NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and through a 
trilateral nuclear agreement, the U.S. became the ultimate guarantor of Taiwan's 
non-nuclear status - facilitated by IAEA inspections. See Mitchell, "Taiwan's Hsin 
Chu Program", 297-8. 
31 Benefiting from the Freedom of Information Act and recent declassification of certain 
records, James Mann's About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with 
China (New York: Vintage, 2000) provides a fascinating account of the negotiation 
process in the early 1970s toward normalization. 
J 
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policy known as "strategic ambiguity" regarding America's commitment 
to Taiwan's security. Operationally, the policy of "strategic ambiguity" 
seeks to achieve double deterrence - against Beijing's use of force and 
against Taipei's provocation- by strategically refraining from specifying 
the precise course of action the U.S. may take so as to encourage 
prudence by all sides. These diplomatic setbacks and improved 
U.S.-PRC relations heightened Taiwan's insecurity and fear of 
abandonment by the U.S. 
The second lesson from this period is that the attitudes and actions of 
the United States- informed by its national interests-- was a key enabling 
or constraining factor in Taiwan's tortuous nuclear program development. 
As stated earlier, during the Cold War, the U.S. sought to pursue a number 
of goals - preventing the spread of communism, nuclear nonproliferation, 
commercial interests for nuclear energy industry. In the 1950s-60s, the 
U.S. appropriated the "one China" myth propagated by both Chiang 
Kai-shek and Mao Zedong (albeit they differed on who represented this 
one China) by recognizing ROC as the real China, thus isolating 
Communist China.32 In 1954, Eisenhower and Chiang signed a mutual 
defense treaty, thus formally incorporating Taiwan under U.S. extended 
deterrence and its alliance system in East Asia. 
U.S. assistance came in various forms. Diplomatically, the U.S. 
supported the ROC's membership in the UN and stalled the PRC's 
membership quest until 1971. Economically, the U.S. initially provided 
32 For a thesis on how the U.S. used this feature to advance its Cold War policy of 
opposing Communist China, see John Garver, The Sino-American Alliance : Nationalist 
China and American Cold War strategy in Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997). 
--
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economtc assistance, and then replaced aid with unilateral trade 
concessions, known as Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), for 
Taiwan's manufactures exports. Militarily, the . U.S. Seventh Fleet 
patrolled waters off Taiwan - preventing Chinese attacks against Taiwan 
and restraining Taiwan from attacking the mainland. The U.S. military 
even stored nuclear weapons on Taiwan and offshore islands, aimed at 
dozens of cities and military targets on the mainland. During the 
Offshore Island Crises of 1955 and 1958, Eisenhower both contemplated 
using those nuclear weapons against the PRC and was concerned about 
"embroilment" in Chiang's futile campaign to militarily retake the 
mainland, which could trigger a wider conflict involving the two 
superpowers. 33 Since Eisenhower had told Chiang that those offshore 
islands were indefensible from a military standpoint, his dilemma over the 
proper response to the Offshore Island Crises was a good illustration of 
the fear of entrapment by the client state. 
Taiwan's civilian and military nuclear programs benefited from either 
direct or indirect U.S. assistance. The U.S. was not only the guarantor of 
Taiwan's non-nuclear weapon state status, but also the chief supplier of 
key material, facilities, and technologies of Taiwan's nuclear power 
industry. In other words, both the U.S. and Taiwan lived up to the 
reciprocal "bargain" under NPT discussed earlier. Table 2 shows that all 
•. 
of the state-owned Taipower's eight light-water reactors (six in operation 
and two being constructed) used to generate electricity are provided by 
leading American nuclear companies. These American companies 
typically sell package deals, which also include fuel and repossession of 
33 Tang Tsou, The Embroilment over Quemoy: Mao, Chiang and Dulles (Institute of 
International Studies, University of Utah, 1959). 
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spent fuel. By doing so, the U.S. does live up to its custodial 
responsibility of helping Taiwan's energy needs, but it also benefits 
American commercial interests and ensures Taiwan's non-nuclear status. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Other than some hydraulic power, Taiwan lacks any significant raw 
energy sources and imports over 97% of raw materials for its energy 
needs. Compared to other sources of energy, such as oil and natural gas, 
nuclear fuel, thanks to its compactness and density, is a better choice from 
a strategic standpoint (less susceptible to wartime energy shortage or 
blockade). Nuclear power thus appears an attractive source of energy. 
It now provides over 20% of Taiwan's electricity needs. 
U.S. attitude toward Taiwan's military nuclear program was even 
more intriguing. The U.S. assisted Taiwan in getting the TRR, the 
nuclear reactor suspected in Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, from 
Canada, and enriched uranium from South Africa. Most of Taiwan's 
scientists in nuclear physics and related fields studied in the U.S. or 
Canada. Thus, it would seem that the U.S. permitted (or even wanted) 
Taiwan to possess certain nuclear capabilities as a potential strategic 
counterweight against the PRC. Yet at the same time, as the main 
architect and arguably chief enforcer of the nonproliferation regime, the 
U.S. did not want Taiwan's nuclear program to get out of control, 
triggering instability or ripple effects in cross-Strait relations and East 
Asian security. Starting from the 1970s, the imperative for improving 
relationship with the PRC as a counterweight against the Soviet Union 
also required the U.S. to reassess its previous "benign" or "permissive" 
attitude toward Taiwan's nuclear program. 
Will Taiwan Contemplate a "Nuclear Option"? 49 
The U.S. dealt a decisive blow to Taiwan's nuclear program in 
January 1988. Col. Chang Hsien-yi, Deputy Director of INER, defected 
to the U.S., carrying with him sensitive information about the nuclear 
weapons program at INER. It turned out that during his study in the 
U.S., Chang was recruited by the American Central Intelligence Agency. 
After returning to INER, he monitored Taiwan's nuclear program for the 
U.S. government.34 As an indication of the severe impact of Chang's 
defection brought upon Taiwan's secret nuclear program, President 
Chiang Ching-kuo died only few days after Chang's "disappearance." 
Armed with incriminating evidence provided by Chang, President Reagan 
demanded the new Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to conclusively and 
verifiably shut down its nuclear program. The Chang Hsien-yi Incident 
marked the decisive end of Taiwan's nuclear weapons program. 
Since 1988, Taiwan's official position has been that it will not apply 
its scientific know-how to build nuclear weapons. 35 Whereas those 
closely involved in Taiwan's nuclear program (e.g., President Chiang 
Ching-kuo and General Hau Pei-tsun, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
understandably viewed Chang as a traitor and the single biggest setback 
for Taiwan's nuclear aspirations, Americans generally viewed the end of 
Taiwan's nuclear program as a success. For example, Bulletin of the 
34 Tim Weiner, "How a Spy Left Taiwan in the Cold." New York Times (20 December 
1997): A7; "Former Top General Reveals Secret Nuclear Weapons Program" (6 January 
2000): 1. Chang had apparently been recruited by the CIA some ten years ago during 
his doctoral study at the University of Tennessee. There were more suspected moles 
planted by CIA inside INER. Interview with Dr. H. 
35 
"MND Refutes Nuclear Bomb Ploy," China Post. (23 December 1997): 16; "Taiwan 
Will Not Develop Nuclear Arms: Defense Minister," Central News Agency (Taiwan)(5 
January 2000). 
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Atomic Scientists hailed this as a "nuclear nightmare averted."36 Amb. 
James Lilley, a former intelligence official and the only American who 
had been the top envoy to Taiwan and China, said that he believed that it 
was time for the Chang Hsien-yi case to be "publicly acknowledged as a 
success, a classic in the annals of intelligence. "37 
However, many years later, today in Taiwan's open environment, 
opinions about Chang seem to be changing. Those· who believe that 
reviving the nuclear option is a bad choice for Taiwan (because it is 
highly risky and the costs outweighs the gains) generally reconcile to have 
a more balanced view on Chang (i.e., there were other technical and 
non-technical limitations to Taiwan's nuclear project, and what Chang did 
may have averted a disaster for Taiwan). For example, without delivery 
systems, Taiwan's nuclear weapons could not be used to inflict harm on 
China. While Taiwan was developing a nuclear bomb during the 1980s, 
there was a joint program to develop a delivery vehicle. Dubbed Tien 
Ma (Sky Horse), the surface-to-surface missile was supposed to carry a 
larger payload than the Tien Kung (Sky Bow), which had a 300kg payload. 
With the demise of the nuclear program (Hsin Chu Project), the Tien Ma 
missile program also died.38 Others argue that in Taiwan's democratic 
and open society today, it is highly unlikely a serious undertaking such as 
developing nuclear weapons can proceed secretly without public 
36 Albright and Gay, "Taiwan." 
37 Weiner, "How a Spy." See also Lilley's testimony at the "Hearing of the 
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence 
Community," U.S. Senate, 19 January 1996, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testlill.htm. 
38 Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Has No Tien Ma Ballistic Missiles," Janes Missiles and 
Rockets (1 October 2002); interviews with Dr. H; and with Dr. Arthur Ding, Institute of 
International Relations, Taipei, Taiwan, 23 December 2005. 
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knowledge or media scrutiny. In the words of one prominent analyst, if 
Taiwan seeks to redevelop nuclear weapons today, it is hard to prevent a 
second "Chang Hsien-yi incident" from happening?9 
The Chang Hsien-yi incident threw the future of INER into disarray. 
The agency faced a major confidence and identity crisis. Many 
researchers, who worked diligently and patriotically, suddenly lost their 
raison d'etre. Although the U.S. took decisive measures to ensure the 
end of Taiwan's nuclear weapons program, it did not ask (or allow) the 
INER to disband. There are different explanations for the U.S.'s mixed 
motivations. One consideration is to view these researchers with 
concern, so having them at one place facilitates monitor and control and 
prevents "proliferation" of nuclear manpower.40 Another view is that the 
U.S. wanted Taiwan to maintain some kind of "near-nuclear capability" 
by virtue of these researchers' expertise. Professor Chien Chung of 
NTHU opined that the U.S. wanted Taiwan to "keep the machine warm 
and await further instructions" (nuanji daiming). He estimated that there 
are still over 800 "national treasures" today. Chung asked: 
It would have been quite easy to totally dissolve Taiwan's 
nuclear manpower; just give all these- people U.S. 
passports! This is one reason why although it is difficult 
to obtain the material, Taiwan's capability to research and 
develop nuclear weapons can never be completely ruled 
39 Dr. Cheng-yi Lin, Research Fellow, Academia Sinica, and a former National Security 
Advisor to President Chen Shui-bian, interview by the author, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 
December 2005. 
40 Interview with Arthur Ding, 23 December 2005. 
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Some of the original INER researchers are still working at INER, 
albeit on new, and less controversial lines of research, but more have 
moved on to other careers, retired, or even died.42 How easy it is to 
reconstitute the talent if a political decision should be made is a matter of 
debate. With the passage of time and a new social milieu, Taiwan's 
nuclear arms expertise has undoubtedly deteriorated but is still 
considerable. With well-developed high-technology industries, experience 
with nuclear industries, and high human capital, Taiwan does possess the 
physical and human infrastructure conducive to the development of 
nuclear weapons - for some of the same reasons why Japan is considered 
a "virtual nuclear proliferant." 
The key is U.S. interests and attitudes. On the one hand, the robust 
approach (including the willingness to use force unilaterally) with which 
the Bush Administration has dealt with the nuclear challenges posed by 
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq would lead us to think that the U.S. would not 
tolerate Taiwan's redevelopment of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, 
if changing national interests due to geopolitical shifts (e.g., if the U.S. 
openly sees China as the main threat) dictate that the U.S. selects a 
reliable nuclear partner or proxy with sufficient technological capabilitie~ 
and compatible national interests, then Taiwan is as safe a choice as any 
Chien Chung reasoned that "If the U.S. decides to give us (what we wan( 
Taiwan is one of the few American allies whom the U.S. can entrust 
41 Interview with Chien Chung, 20 December 2005. 
42 For example, Dr. H now owns a small computer company. 
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given our R&D capability and economic development."43 
The third lesson learned from the history of Taiwan's nuclear program 
is that Taiwan's excessive dependence on the U.S. security commitment 
gave the U.S. excessive leverage over Taiwan's nuclear aspirations. The 
same logic worked in how the U.S. successfully defused the nuclear 
aspirations of several other allies, such as Japan and South Korea.44 
Taiwan's dependence on the U.S. is arguably more acute than Japan's and 
South Korea's, because Taiwan is no longer under explicit treaty 
protection of the U.S. and any U.S. support of Taiwan has to take into 
account China's possible reaction. This gives the U.S. unusually large 
leverage over Taiwan's nuclear aspirations. For the foreseeable future, 
the U.S. can manage Taiwan's nuclear programs by its mixed strategy of 
preventing proliferation, maintaining near-nuclear capabilities, and 
sharing the fruits of peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Current Status of Taiwan's Nuclear Programs 
Since the permanent halt of Taiwan's nuclear weapons program in 
1988, there has been arguably a normative transformation in Taiwan's 
nuclear research. Overall, Taiwan's 1988 commitment to the U.S. went 
beyond those obligations mandated by the NPT.45 The AEC, the nation's 
highest nuclear energy regulatory agency, conforms to IAEA code and 
43 Interview with Chien Chung. 
44 Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," in 
Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping 
Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 2004), pp. 218-53; and Jonathan D. Pollack and Mitchell B. Reiss, "South 
Korea: The Tyranny of Geography and the Vexation of History," op cit., 254-92. 
45 Mitchell, 'Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program," 301. 
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guidance, even though Taiwan is not a member ofiAEA.46 
A nuclear taboo has become deeply entrenched. No aspiring military 
officer or scientist seeks to advance their career through involvement in 
nuclear weapons research. Public discourse also decidedly shows no 
interest in this subject. 
Today, Taiwan's nuclear programs are ostensibly all for peaceful use. 
Since 1988, Taiwan's policy regarding weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) has evolved into a consistent "five noes" policy: "Taiwan will 
never manufacture, develop, acquire, stockpile, or employ WMD of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare agents, warheads, or any forms 
of weapons." The official statement appeared in each issue of National 
Defense Report, the English white paper published every second year by 
the Ministry of Defense. 47 This categorical statement is intended to 
dispel any doubt. 
Furthermore, since it came to power, the current ruling party, DPP, has 
endeavored to implement its stated policy of promoting a nuclear-free 
homeland. The Nuclear-Free Homeland bill, approved by the Cabinet on 
7 May 2003, called for Taiwan to show the world and its children that it 
had the resolve to build a home that is free from the intimidation of 
nuclear weapons and the health hazard of radioactive waster by striving 
toward six goals: (1) no development of nuclear weapons, (2) a gradual 
46 Dr. Wei-li Chen, "Overview of Civil Nuclear Situation in Taiwan," PowerPoint 
presentation (Atomic Energy Council, 1 November 2005). 
47 Ministry of Defense, 2004 National Defense Report, 221. 
-
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end of nuclear power, provided energy sources are secure, (3) adjustment 
of energy policy, (4) development of clean and renewable energy, (5) 
safeguarding of radiation safety, and ( 6) selection of permanent 
depository for radioactive waste. However, this anti-nuclear bill still has 
not yet been passed in the Legislative Yuan to which the DPP is minority. 
Nevertheless, the DPP believes its anti-nuclear policy is consistent with 
worldwide trends.48 
The ideational change is also reflected in the changing attitudes of 
today's youth toward nuclear industries. Whereas Nuclear Physics used 
to attract young and bright students with a lucrative career and patriotism, 
today Taiwan's students, out of very pragmatic considerations, regard 
Computer Science, Electric Engineering, or Biotechnology with higher 
esteem. NTHU, the "cradle" of Taiwan's nuclear science, has 
reorganized in light of the new zeitgeist. NTHU's College of Nuclear 
Science consists of Departments of Engineering and System Science (ESS) 
and Nuclear Science. The former was previously called Nuclear 
Engineering, and the latter just changed its name (and presumably mission) 
to Biomedical Engineering and Environmental Science (BEES) as of 1 
July 2006. 49 ESS 's current nuclear programs include nano-materials, 
electronics & plasma engineering, micro-electro-mechanical system, 
nuclear engineering & radiology, energy engineering, and plasma science 
& engineering. The BEES will focus on health and medical physics, 
molecular medical physics and biophotonics, environmental molecular 
48 Interview with Dr. Min-sheng Ouyang, Minister of AEC. 
49 Information from the two institutes' websites: 
http://www.ess.nthu.edu. tw/% 7Ecollege/index _ eng.html and 
http://www.nthu.edu.tw/departs _ 0 1/dir-62 _ m.htm. 
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science, and physics, chemistry, and biology interdisciplinary 
undergraduate program. 50 
Even INER, home of the aborted nuclear program, is redirecting its 
research activities. As of 2003, INER employed 1,076 people, including 
40% researchers, 44% technicians, 9% administrative personnel, and 7% 
maintenance workers (Institute ofNuclear Energy Report 2004: 6-7). As 
of July 2005, the annual budget for INER was $87.5 million, broken down 
for the three technology centers: environmental and energy technology 
(EETC) (56%), radiation application technology (RATC) (24%), and 
nuclear safety technology (NSTC) (20%). 51 NSTC was engaged in 
radiation detection & protection, and nuclear safety & regulation 
technology. EETC focused on advanced energy, environmental 
protection, nuclear facilities decommission, and radioactive waste 
management. RATC approached biomedical application by isotopes and 
radiation technology. 52 
In sum, Taiwan's current nuclear programs appear solely for peaceful 
purposes. The current ruling party maintains a fundamentally 
anti-nuclear policy. With respect to the security implications of this 
seemingly conclusive renunciation of nuclear weapons, Taiwan seems to 
rely on America's tacit security commitment, the international norm 
against nuclear weapons states' using nuclear arms against non-nuclear 
weapons states, and maintaining the technological infrastructure of a 
5° Chen, "Overview." 
51 Taun-ran Yeh, "Review of Current Major Activities at INER," PowerPoint 
presentation (INER, November 2005). 
52 Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER), 2003 Annual Report Institute of 
Nuclear Energy Research (Longtan., 2004), 6. 
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thriving civilian nuclear program as a "virtual proliferant"- a nation that 
could quickly restart its nuclear program if it decided to do so. The 
decision is mainly political; but it is also technological. It is driven by a 
normative shift, but also instrumental considerations. 
On the Brink of the Rubicon? Imperatives and Options 
Should Taiwan cross the nuclear "tipping point" to formally 
incorporate a nuclear capability in its national security planning? Before 
that question can be answered, considerations should be given to whether 
Taiwan can develop nuclear weapons (under certain circumstances), if it 
decides to? As I argued earlier, both capabilities and intentions are 
important to this calculus. But broader issues, such as global 
nonproliferation regime, prevailing technologies, regional security 
environment, threat perception, U.S. security and foreign policy, 
relationship with the U.S., and robustness of U.S. security commitment, in 
turn, influence the assessment on capabilities and intentions. 
In terms of feasibility, analysts disagree. Some believe that if 
Taiwan changed its mind and decided to develop nuclear weapons, it 
could do so quickly, perhaps within a year or two. 53 Having the 
infrastructure for nuclear research (INER and NTHU) and experience 
with nuclear power generation, the world's 1 ih largest economy, and 3rd 
largest foreign exchange reserves, 54 Taiwan appears to, prima facie, 
possess the human and financial capital needed for a resumption of 
53 Mitchell, "Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program," 301. 
54 According to the CIA World Factbook, Taiwan's Gross Domestic Product 
(in purchasing power parity) in 2005 was estimated at $611.5 billion and its foreign 
exchange reserves as of2005 were at $225.8 billion. Information available online at 
http :I lwww.odci. gov I cia!publicationslfactbook/rankorderl200 lrank.html and 
http :I lwww. odci. gov I cia/publicationslfactbook/rankorderl2188rank.html. 
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nuclear program. 
Others are more skeptical. Some analysts point out the high cost to 
restart the program ($10 billion), the predictable resistance by the party 
holding legislative majority (the so-called Pan-Blue, which held up the 
government's proposed budgets for the purchase of the arms package 
approved for sale by President George W. Bush in 2001 for three years 
from 2004-7), the tight monitor and control by the U.S. and the IAEA,55 
and the inability to find suitable locations on the island to conduct nuclear 
tests,56 among others, as reasons why the nuclear option is not quite 
feasible. 
On the desirability issue, analysts are also divided, although few are 
willing to openly advocate the development of nuclear weapons. 
Sometimes it is not entirely clear these unorthodox comments reflected 
simply bravado or hinted at some secret programs. Officials who made 
this sort of remarks invariably retracted their comments, presumably 
because of the unwanted attention or misinterpretation their comments 
had attracted. For instance, former President Lee Teng-hui, in his reply 
to a question in the National Assembly on 28 July 1995 on Taiwan's 
nuclear intentions, said: "Whether or not we need the protection of 
nuclear weapons, we should re-study the question from a long-term point 
of view." This prompted Reuters to run a story saying that Taiwan 
meant to reconsider the use of nuclear weapons, which prompted 
Taiwan's Foreign Minister Fredrick Chien to issue a categorical denial 
55 Dr. Chong-pin Lin, former Deputy Defense Minister, interview by the author, Taipei, 
Taiwan, 16 December 2005. 
56 Interview with Arthur Ding. 
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that Taiwan had any intention of developing nuclear weapons, blaming 
the reporters for misunderstanding and misinterpreting a Chinese phrase 
the President had used. 57 Regardless, such comments kept alive 
ambiguities over Taiwan's nuclear capabilities. 
A vocal minority has always stressed Taiwan's need to have nuclear 
weapons to deter China from attacking the island. A researcher affiliated 
with the Taiwan Research Institute, which is closely related to former 
President Lee Teng-hui, argues that Taiwan cannot rely on China's pledge 
of "no use" of nuclear weapons against Taiwan58 and should instead 
develop a counter-value nuclear deterrent against possible Chinese use of 
nuclear arms against Taiwan.59 An editorial m the English-language 
Taipei Times in 2004 argues that "the ability to obliterate China's 10 
largest cities and the Three Gorges Dam would be a powerful deterrent to 
China's adventurism."60 To rally support for the arms procurement, on 
25 September 2004, former Premier Yu Shyi-kun said that Taiwan should 
57 Teo Paul Lin, "Taipei says Categorically: No Building ofN-arms." The Strait Times (9 
August 1995): 13. 
58 In the aftermath of former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state 
relations" remarks, a Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Sun Yuxi, when asked if 
China would use nuclear weapons against Taiwan, extended China's No-First Use 
principle to Taiwan: "We will not be the first to use nuelear weapons and will not use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons countries and regions, let alone against 
our Taiwan compatriots." See "China Says It Will Not Use Nuclear Weapons Against 
Taiwan," New York Times (3 September 1999): A3. Yet, Sha Zukang, China's former 
chief arms cQntrol negotiator, touched off a storm by claiming that China's commitment 
to a "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons against any state does not extend to Taiwan, 
because "Taiwan as a province of China, not a state so the policy of no-first-use does not 
apply." See ''N-weapons Use Does Not Apply to Taiwan," Strait Times (6 August 1996): 
3. 
59 Hung-hsiang Liao [~~tt$], "tll!fff!M~!I!~IB];;ffiff:t [Taiwan Should Develop 
Strategic Nuclear Weapons]," ifi-jjf/flJf,f!jjftff;t [Defense International] 175(March 1999): 
18-21, available online at http://www.taiwanesevoice.net/cyber/09/19990300.htm. 
60 
"Taiwan Needs Nuclear Deterrent," Taipei Times (13 August 2004): 8. 
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rely on a Cold War-style "balance of terror" to safeguard national security 
in the face of intimidation from Beijing.61 
Eschewing such bravado, an International Relations scholar believes 
that Taiwan should forego the production and development of nuclear 
weapons to avoid the predictable intense international scrutiny and 
pressure, but keep mum about acquiring nuclear weapons.62 He was 
hinting at the international black markets as the fastest way for Taiwan to 
acquire nuclear weapons. But Chung disagrees: "Without testing, the 
quality of acquired weapons cannot be assured, and the numbers so 
acquired will be insufficient to constitute a deterrent, but Taiwan's 
reputation will surely suffer." 63 Andrew Yang of the Council on 
Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS), a top think tank on security issues, 
thinks that nuclear weapons are actually a liability for Taiwan's security, 
because they further complicate Taiwan's security challenge.64 
This is an example of security interaction: Taiwan's development of 
nuclear weapons for self-defense will be seen as offensive by China, 
which had averred that this would constitute one of the Beijing-defined 
conditions for using force against Taiwan. So there are good 
instrumental reasons for Taiwan to adopt a non-nuclear policy. 
In an article disputing Premier Yu's "balance of terror" call, Professor 
61 Kathrin Hille, "Taiwan is Seeking Missiles That Could Hit China." The Financial 
Times (27 September 2004): 5; and "Yu Heralds a 'Balance of Terror,"' Taipei Times (26 
September 2004): 1. 
62 Interview with an International Relations scholar, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 December 2005. 
63 Interview with Chien Chung. 
64 Interview with Andrew Yang, Secretary-General, CAPS, 21 December 2005, Taipei, 
Taiwan. 
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Chien Chung of NTHU concludes that developing WMDs for the sake of 
engaging in a "balance of terror" with the adversary is not indispensable 
to Taiwan's national strategy, nor will it enhance Taiwan's national 
. 65 
secunty. 
Government officials think that there cannot be any ambiguity in 
Taiwan's nuclear policy and one hundred percent transparency is the best 
. 66 
optwn. 
To summarize Taiwan's rationales for contemplating the "nuclear 
option": Taiwan may cross the nuclear Rubicon if it believes that the 
military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait has become so huge and the 
prospect for Beijing to use forceful ways to unify Taiwan has become so 
real that only nuclear weapons can serve as a quick "equalizer" and 
preserve Taiwan's independence or as a last-ditch effort to draw the 
superpowers into the conflict. 67 
Table 3 shows that China has all classes of WMDs and their delivery 
systems, but Taiwan only has short-range ballistic missiles carrying 
conventional warheads. Table 4 shows the rapid increase in China's 
defense spending since 1990, powered by the huge expansion of China's 
economy. Whereas China's booming economy has allowed it to post 
double-digit gains in defense expenditure in each of the past fifteen years, 
65 Chien Chung [W~], "~:1J1ll:JGf,*tHI"J!I!~~B : if:£1!H~JG:R IT' rl'd11Jzr:1tr .!1 IDt~~llli 
[Perspectives on Strategy: Omni-directional Thinking: Speaking about Premier Yu's 
'Balance ofTerror'],"~.ifw#N Cutting-Edge Technology (November 2004): 21-27. 
66 Interviews with Deputy Minister Michael Tsai, 23 December 2005, and Minister 
Ouyang, 20 December 2005. 
67 Rosen, "After Proliferation", 12. 
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Taiwan's defense expenditure has declined in both absolute and relative 
terms, as the government now spends more on social welfare. As 
Pentagon's recent annual reports on China's military power indicate, 
China has devoted substantial resources into weapon systems that can be 
used in asymmetric war to present a "credible" option" to intimidate or 
actually attack Taiwan and to deny possible U.S. intervention. 68 Under 
this scenario, a desperate Taiwan may find nuclear weapons attractive to 
restore some semblance ofbalance. 
(Tables 3 and 4 about here) 
Many analysts worry that the military balance is quickly shifting to 
Beijing's favor. Since Taiwan can not be expected to engage in an 
expensive arms race with China (see Table 4), David Shambaugh argues 
that it is "only a matter of time" that Taiwan will lose the military 
advantage in the Taiwan Strait. 69 
Additionally, the advent of the so-called "Second Nuclear Age" in 
East Asia, with many states in the region on the heels of their successful 
economic development now developing missiles and other WMDs, 70 
Taiwan may feel that developing nuclear weapons is necessary just to 
preserve its previous relative security status. The situation is 
compounded by the fact that Asia lacks NATO-style multilateral regional 
security institutions to mitigate the security dilemma among various 
68 Military Power or the Peoples Republic of China 2006. 
69 Shambaugh, "A Matter of Taiwan." 
70 Bracken, Fire in the East; Joseph Cirincione, "The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,' 
Foreign Policy (Spring 2000): 120-136. 
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states/1 and the fact that China has insisted that Taiwan be excluded from 
all regional security institutions (such as the Regional Forum of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ARF), despite the fact that 
conflict in the Taiwan Strait will seriously affect many states in the region. 
To sum up the factors that influence Taiwan's decision to develop 
nuclear weapons from the standpoints of feasibility and desirability, Table 
5 summarizes the "enabling" and "inhibiting" factors. 
(Table 5 about here) 
Table 5 shows that while there are quite a number of enabling factors 
that favor Taiwan's development of nuclear weapons both from the 
standpoints of desirability (demand-side explanations) and feasibility 
(supply-side explanations), the overall cost seems to outweigh the benefit, 
suggesting that a "virtual" nuclear capability is a more plausible option 
than an explicit project. As long as the U.S. implicit nuclear umbrella is 
seen as credible, Taiwan's nuclear option can remain virtual. The only 
imaginable scenario for Taiwan to cross the nuclear Rubicon is when the 
following three conditions are present simultaneously: (1) There are 
serious problems with the credibility of America's tacit nuclear umbrella; 
(2) The U.S. is perceived ready to abandon Taiwan -in the face of Chinese 
assertiveness; and (3) The cross-Strait military balance has become so 
lopsided in favor of China that only nuclear weapons can restore some 
(semblance of) balance. Naturally, these are extraordinary conditions 
71 Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in Multipolar Asia." 
International Security 18(3)(Winter 1993): 5-33. For a more comprehensive analysis of 
the various modalities for maintaining security in anarchic Asia, see Muthiah Alagappa, 
ed. Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford University 
Press, 2002). 
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under which the unthinkable can happen. 
Taiwan, of course, can theoretically take any of the following routes, 
rather than going nuclear, to shore up its security: (1) negotiating with the 
PRC- the only state that threatens Taiwan's survival- to establish some 
type of confidence-building measures, and (2) joining regional or global 
institutions to involve the international community to "socialize" the risk 
posed to Taiwan's security. But (1) is fraught with many problems. At 
the very least, it will require Taiwan to abjure the pursuit of de jure 
independence for 30 to 50 years in return for Beijing's promise not to use 
force against Taiwan,72 which the DPP was unwilling to accept. Others 
justifiably doubt Beijing's trustworthiness. And at any rate, 
confidence-building measures will result from, rather than give rise to, a 
long period of fostering mutual trust. Given the deep mistrust between 
the two sides, depending on China for Taiwan's security will require a 
leap of faith that is currently not supported by evidence. 
(2) is similarly impractical. Beijing's isolation of Taiwan- through 
mandating all states and international organizations to respect its "one 
China" principle -means that few countries or organizations are willing 
to take up the issue of Taiwan's security for fearing of antagonizing China. 
In fact, Beijing's refusal to permit Taiwan more "international space" 
contributes to Taiwan's alienation from and mistrust of China. 
72 This "double renunciation" formula forms the basis of Kenneth Lieberthal's "interim 
agreement" proposal. See his "Preventing a War Over Taiwan." Foreign Affairs 
84(2)(March-April2005): 53-59. Lieberthal advocated this concept before and after his 
stint in the Clinton Administration's National Security Council. 
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This leaves only the U.S. (and possibly in partnership with Japan) as 
Taiwan's possible counterweight vis-a-vis China. After the end of the 
Cold War, in the aftermath of the counter-terrorism war and China's rise, 
the U.S. has strengthened its military posture in East Asia, while adhering 
to the global posture review in light ofthe new security challenges.73 In 
February 2005, the foreign and defense ministers of the U.S. and Japan 
(the Security Consultation Talk, or "2+2" talks) declared that "the 
peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through 
dialogue" as a "common strategic objective" of the enhanced alliance.74 
This highly symbolic act signifies the increasing desire for the U.S. and 
Japan to coordinate their military actions in a Taiwan contingency as well 
as "preventive diplomacy," but it does not change the fundamental U.S. 
policy of "strategic ambiguity." Therefore, as long as Taiwan feels 
reasonably assured by U.S. security commitment, albeit implicit and not 
unconditional, it prefers to forego the costly nuclear option and invests 
elsewhere. Conversely, if the U.S. fundamental policy of "maintaining 
the status quo" (essentially a non-unification policy) should change to one 
of favoring unification or de jure independence, Taiwan may seek nuclear 
weapons. In the pro-unification scenario, Taiwan may think that it has 
been abandoned by the U.S. and that only nuclear weapons can help 
Taiwan resist China's incorporation and preserve Taiwan's de facto 
independence. In the pro-independence scenario, Taiwan may seek 
nuclear weapons, on its own or with U.S. assistance, to resist the 
anticipated Chinese military attack. 
73 See Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 30 September 2001) and the most recent QDR published in 
early 2006. 
74 The text of the joint declaration is available from the State Department's website 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm [accessed 19 February 2005]. 
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It should be noted there is one other scenario that could see Taiwan 
possessing nuclear weapons. Some analysts, such as Ted Galen 
Carpenter, 75 view the current U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" 
untenable, because it will lead to a war between two nuclear powers - the 
U.S. and China- over Taiwan. Carpenter especially calls for the U.S. to 
categorically renounce any security commitment toward Taiwan in return 
for selling Taiwan any weapons the Taiwanese want (presumably nuclear 
weapons included) and holding them responsible if they provoke China. 
The impact of Taiwan's becoming nuclear on regional security 1s 
expected to be largely negative. China previously declared that 
developing nuclear weapons is one of the causes for using force against 
Taiwan.76 Due to the double stimulation provided by the "demonstration 
effect" of America's abandonment of Taiwan and the militarily more 
belligerent China, Japan may renounce its decades-old pacifist policy and 
reconsider the nuclear option. 
In sum, a "perfect storm" caused by increasing Chinese military threat, 
deteriorating regional security, and abandonment by the U.S. may force 
Taiwan to cross the nuclear Rubicon. 
If Taiwan should seriously consider the nuclear option, what role will 
nuclear weapons play in the nation's security and force posture? 
75 Ted Galen Carpenter, Americas Coming War with China: A Collision Course Over 
Taiwan (New York: Palgrave, 2005). 
76 Over the years, depending on the changing situation in the Taiwan Strait, China has 
altered the conditions under which it might use force against Taiwan, despite its 
professed policy of "peaceful reunification." The most recent such conditions are 
included in the 2000 White Paper on the Taiwan issue and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. 
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Nuclear Option and National Security Strategy 
My research, which is based on open sources, has failed to find any 
good discussion on the role of nuclear weapons plays in Taiwan's national 
security strategy. This is due to two reasons. First, the Taiwanese 
society is deeply divided over the issue of national identity, which is 
closely related to the public's preference over the final relationship 
between China and Taiwan. This division, unfortunately, also contributes 
to divergent views on the sporadic debate over nuclear weapons. At the 
risk of oversimplification, there exists a high degree of, albeit imperfect, 
correlation between national identity and attitudes toward nuclear 
weapons. Analysts who are more closely associated with the Pan Blue 
(KMT, People First Party, and New Party) are more likely to (1) consider 
themselves as "Chinese" or "both Chinese and Taiwanese," (2) 
acknowledge that Taiwan is at least culturally and historically part of 
China, (3) expect that the people-to-people exchange and economic 
integration across the Taiwan Strait may gradually reduce the mistrust and 
tension between the two sides and eventually bring about reconciliation, 
and (4) therefore oppose the nuclear option on the ground that it is 
unnecessary (to be used against "compatriots") or even dangerous. 
The DPP's official stance is anti-nuclear. However, I have also 
found that those few Taiwan analysts who are in favor of the nuclear 
option are invariably associated with the Pan Green (DPP and the Taiwan 
Solidarity Union). They are more likely to: (1) consider themselves as 
"Taiwanese only," or "both Taiwanese and Chinese," but never "Chinese," 
(2) see Taiwan and China as two separate countries, (3) view China as a 
hostile external enemy which is getting more and more menacing, and (4) 
therefore favor developing nuclear weapons as deterrent against Chinese 
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aggression. Under this schism involving primordial identities, 
well-informed and rational discussions are very difficult to emerge. 
Second, because Taiwan is not a major power (yet can be 
characterized as a middle power that is dependent upon a powerful 
superpower), well-informed discussions on national strategy, military 
strategy, and national security are rare. Furthermore, since the government 
has never publicly discussed nuclear policy and has staked out a 
categorical nuclear renunciation policy, there has not been a discourse on 
the role of nuclear weapons on national security. 
Nevertheless, we can make some educated guesses based on the 
government's stated policy and idiosyncratic scholarly and journalistic 
sources. 
The most lofty aspirations of Taiwan's national security policy can be 
found in the ROC Constitution. Article 137 states that "the objectives of 
the ROC's national defense are the safeguarding of national security and 
the preservation of world peace." Article 1 of the ROC National Defense 
Act states: "The goal of the ROC's national defense is to protect national 
security and safeguard world peace through display of national strength as 
a whole and building of a national defense military force."77 These 
fundamental and enduring objectives and aspirations should form the , 
nation's highest strategy - national strategy, according to scholar Chien 
Chung. In contrast, strategies at lower levels, such as military strategies, 
tactics, political, economic, psychological strategies can adjust according 
77 Taiwan Yearbook 2004, 101. 
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to the changing circumstances and evolving national needs.78 
For example, Taiwan's military white paper states that "the current 
military strategy of the ROC military is based on 'effective deterrence, 
resolute defense' (~5<:)(:1J;~£!. , ~JJ1%r~~)" and "the basic goals of our 
current defense policy are 'preventing war, homeland security, and 
counterterrorism' (TJ[~JJ,~"¥ , ~±~JJ1%r , 15U~tU~)."79 
In this context, the nuclear option will serve mainly as a deterrent, 
albeit a dubious one. The DPP hardliners prefer the Cold War-style 
deterrence, which would require 3Cs: capability, credibility, and 
communication. In other words, successful execution of this type of 
deterrence would require that Taiwan actually has a sizable nuclear 
arsenal, has tested it or used it, and indicates that it is willing to use it 
again (thus closer to possessing a minimal deterrence capability?). That 
is to say, it hopes to dissuade an adversary from doing something by 
clearly demonstrating both real capability and intention. These 
requirements are perhaps far-fetched for Taiwan in terms of both 
capability and the international reaction to Taiwan's possible intention. 
Instead, Chung thinks a more ambiguous strategy inspired by Sun Tzu , 
which combines both real (jf)and empty (l!!II), is the best.80 
It should be noted that some Chinese-language media report that 
Taiwan's Ministry of Defense was building the country's first-ever 
78 Chung, "Perspectives on Strategy." 
79 2004 National Defense Report, 56. 
80 Chung, "Perspectives." For an English translation of Sun Tzu, see Sun Tzu, The 
Art ofWar, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963). 
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"strategic force," which is expected to have small-scale fighting capability 
in 2007.81 This capability is pivoted on Taiwan's improved missiles 
which now have a range of 600-1,000 km- enough to reach such Chinese 
cities as Shanghai, with the aim of further improving the range to 2,000 
km- as far as Beijing. 
Taiwan's recent progress in missile technology- a possible delivery 
vehicle -- is a significant technological accomplishment for Taiwan's 
military. However, if these improved missiles can only carry 
conventional warheads, they are unlikely to deter a China that is willing to 
use nuclear weapons against Taiwan, although China will have to pay a 
very high political price for such blatant deviation from its no-first-use 
policy. Therefore, such accomplishments also rekindle speculation on 
the status of Taiwan's strategic (including nuclear) capabilities. 
Under current security situation in East Asia, Taiwan has to walk a 
very tight rope on its security strategy: It must do everything possible to 
maintain America's political and military support. It must not give 
China any excuse for unprovoked attack. If it decides to develop a 
nuclear capability, it must do it in the most discrete circumstances. 
Under these conditions, Taiwan's "nuclear option" will always exist in the 
virtual world. 
81 
"Special Missiles Are Deployed on Offshore Islands Near the Mainland" (in Chinese) 
United Daily News (16 October 2006). Available online a 
http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/3559805.shtml. [accessed 16 October 2006]. 
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Table I: Timeline of Taiwan's Nuclear Program During the Cold War 
1955 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) founded to promote peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. 
Taipower created Atomic Power Research Commission. 
National Tsinghua University (NTHU) reopened in Hsinchu, with a Graduate 
Institute of Atomic Science. 
1956 Taiwan opened its first nuclear reactor, given by the U.S., at NTHU. 
1964 China successfully tested nuclear weapons, stimulating Taiwan to develop a full-
scale nuclear program. 
1965 The predecessor of the military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and 
Technology (CSIST) was established. The proposed First Institute would become 
the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER). 
1967 The $140 million "Hsin Chu" project was launched, consisting of primarily 
procuring and operating a heavy-water reactor, a heavy-water production plant, a 
reprocessing research lab, and a plutonium separation plant. 
1968 ROC joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Supervision oflNER was moved to AEC 
1969 INER purchased a small heavy-water reactor (40-megawatt), dubbed Taiwan 
Research Reactor (TRR), from Canada., which became operational in 1973. 
INER served mainly to facilitate Taiwan's procurement of elements to produce 
plutonium. 
1971 IAEA negotiation of safeguard agreement short-circuited by UN's transfer of 
recognition. Eventually, agreement reached so the US became the ultimate legal 
guarantor ofTaiwan's non-nuclear status. 
1974 CIA concluded that Taiwan was working toward a nuclear weapons capability and 
would be capable of producing a nuclear weapon within five years. 
1976 Premier Chiang Ching-kuo promised Taiwan would not acquire its own 
reprocessing facilities or engage in any activities related to reprocessing. 
1977 U.S. pressured Taiwan to dismantle reprocessing facilities and return US-supplied 
plutonium. Brought under control, but concerns remained. 
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1978 President Jimmy Carter normalized relations with the PRC. 
Taipower's first nuclear reactor began producing electricity. Over the years, 
electricity generated by Taipower's six reactors, all U.S.-made, rose to 20'Yo of 
Taiwan's electricity needs. The fourth nuclear plant, with two more modem 
reactors, is scheduled to operate in 2006-7. 
1987 INER began building a multiple hot cell facility. 
1988 Col. Chang Hsien-yi, Deputy Director of INER and a CIA spy, defected and 
revealed Taiwan's plans. CIA estimated Taiwan was within one or two years of 
developing a nuclear bomb. 
President Chiang Ching-kuo died. 
U.S. govemment agencies and IAEA inspectors shut down TRR and the hot cell. 
President Lee Teng-hui promised President Ronald Reagan Taiwan would agree 
to end conclusively and verifiably its nuclear weapons program. 
Sources: See Note 6. Author's compilation. 
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Table 2: Taiwan's Nuclear Power Plants 
Nuclear power plant and Net output Supplier of Year and month of 
location (MWe) nuclear reactor commercial 
operation 
1st Nuclear Power Plant 604 G.E. (U.S.) 12/1978 
(Shimen, Taipei County) 604 G.E. (U.S.) 07/1979 
2nd Nuclear Power Plant 948 G.E. (U.S.) 12/1981 
(Wanli, Taipei County) 948 G.E. (U.S.) 03/1983 
3rd Nuclear Power Plant 890 Westinghouse 07/1984 
(Hengchun, Pingtung County) (U.S.) 
890 Westinghouse 05/1985 
(U.S.) 
4th Nuclear Power Plant 1350 G.E. (U.S.) 07/2006* 
(Gongliao, Taipei County) 1350 G.E.(U.S.) 07/2007* 
Note:* ProJected. ConstructiOn ofthe 4th nuclear plant started m 1998 but was halted m 
October 2000, after the DPP, which espoused an eventual nuclear-free homeland, came to 
power. Thanks to a constitutional interpretation rendered by the Grand Justices and 
weeks of inter-party negotiations, the project was resumed in February 200 I. 
Sources: Chung (2004a: 140); Government Information Office (2002: 164). 
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Table 3: Status of Weapons of Mass Destruction, China vs. Taiwan, 2004 
Indicator China Taiwan 
Nuclear weapons status Confirmed None 
Chemical weapons status Probable Suspected 
Biological weapons status Suspected Suspected 
Short-range ballistic missile status Conlinneda Confinnedg 
-
Medium-range ballistic missile status Confirmed~; None 
Intermediate-range ballistic missile status None None 
Submarine-launched ballistic missile status Contim1edc None 
Intercontinental ballistic missile status Contirmcdd None 
Strategic bomber status None None 
Strategic submarine status Confirmed" None 
WMD commitments BTWC,CWC, NPT1' 
Notes: 
NPTr 
a CSS-6 (DF-15/M9), CSS-7 (DF-11/M-ll), CSS-8 (DF-7). Over 650 DF-11 (M-
Il) and DF-15 (M-9) are deployed opposite Taiwan. 
h CSS-2 (DF-3), CSS-5 (DF-21). Several dozens that can reach Japan, India, and 
Russia. 
" CSS-N-3 {J-1) 
d 30+: 24 CSS-4 (DF-5A), 8 CSS-9 (DF-31 }, CSS-3 (DF-4). Two dozen or so can 
reach the U.S. and Europe 
" I 
r BTWC: acceded 15 November 1984; CTBT: signed 24 September 1996, not 
ratified; CWC: signed 13 January 1993, ratified 25 April 1997; NPT: acceded 9 
March 1992 
g Ching Feng, Tien Chi 
h The ROC ratified the NPT in 1970. The 1971 UN Resolution 2758, which 
paved the way for ROC's expulsion from the UN, deprives ROC's right to sign 
multilateral treaties, such as CWC and BTWC, but ROC government has stated 
that it will abide by both treaties nevertheless. In addition, it has stated that it will 
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continue to abide by the NPT. 
Sources: Author's compilation ofNational Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Research 
Team findings, 2004, obtained through Strategic Asia data query service, available at 
(http://strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/DataSheet/Criteria.aspx) and Nuclear Threat Initiative 
(NTI) country pages on China 
(http://nti.org/e research/profiles/China/print/index 5506.prt) and Taiwan 
(http://nti.org/e researchlprofiles/Taiwan/print/index.prt); Wikipedia entry on "Taiwan 
and weapons of mass destruction," 
http:/ /en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_ and_ weapons_ of_ mass_ destruction. 
Table 4: Defense Spending and Economy, China vs. Taiwan 
Select Years 
China Taiwan 
GDP Defense Defense GDP Defense Defense 
($ billions, expenditur expenditure ($ billions, expenditure expenditure 
PPP) e($ (%ofGDP) PPP) ($ billions) (%of 
billions) GDP) 
1990 413 11.3 3.1 151 8.7 5.4 
1995 3,500 33.0 5.9 291 13.1 5.0 
2000 4,500 42.0 3.9 386 17.6 5.6 
2005 8,182 81.5 4.3 612 7.9 2.4 
.. Sources: Author's compilatiOn of IISS, Mthtary Balance data obtamed from Strategtc 
Asia data query service (http:l/strategicasia.nbr.org/Data/DataSheet/Criteria.aspx) and 
CIA, The World Factbook (http://www.odci.gov/cialpublications/factbook/index.html) 
country pages on China and Taiwan. 
-
76 Tamkang Journal of International Affairs 
Table 5: To Do Or Not to Do?- Factors Influencing Taiwan's Nuclear Decision 
Desirability (demand-side) Feasibility (supply-side) 
Enabling factors • to offset acute power • Military nuclear technical 
asymmetry between China and expertise can be reconstituted? 
Taiwan (quick "equalizer") • Civilian nuclear technical 
• to ensure survival (existential expertise 
deterrence) • Progress made in missile 
• last-ditch effort after being technology 
abandoned by the patron state 
Inhibiting • Opposition from the patron • Military nuclear expertise 
factors state (even a pretext for degraded 
abandonment'?) • Difticulty in material 
• Opposition from within acquisition 
Taiwan's democratic society • Lack of test sites 
• PRC's possible preemptive • Secrecy can't be assured 
strike 
